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Embracing undecidability: Cognitive needs and theory
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Abstract
There are many ways we can not know. Even in systems that we created ourselves,
as, for example, systems in mathematical logic, Goe¨del and Tarski’s theorems impose
limits on what we can know. As we try to speak of the real world, things get even
harder. We want to compare the results of our mathematical theories to observations,
and that means the use of inductive methods. While we can demonstrate how an
ideal probabilistic induction should work, the requirements of such a method include a
few infinities. Furthermore, it would not be even enough to be able to compute those
methods and obtain predictions. There are cases where underdeterminacy might be
unavoidable, such as the interpretation of quantum mechanics or the current status
of string theory. Despite that, scientists still behave as if they were able to know the
truth. As it becomes clear that such behavior can cause severe cognitive mistakes, the
need to accept our limits, both our natural human limits and the limits of the tools
we have created, become apparent. This essay will discuss how we must accept that
knowledge is almost only limited to formal systems. Moreover, even in those, there will
always be undecidable propositions. We will also see how those questions influence the
evaluation of current theories in physics.
Keywords: Theory choice; String theory; Bayesian methods; Undecidability; Phi-
losophy of Science
1 Introduction
The attempts, at the start of the XXth century, to base mathematical knowledge (and from
there, all human knowledge) on logic was a brave effort. The attempts might have failed,
but they were an honest and very much needed effort to diminish the influence of human
subjectivity in our conclusions. However, instead of obtaining reliable recipes on how we
can prove and know statements, we have learned there are limits to what we can achieve.
Those happen even in mathematical logic. In pure mathematical systems, we decide the
fundamental axioms. There is no need to match the real world. While those systems are
artificial worlds we create, that does not mean we can know every statement in those worlds.
Assuming we did not introduce any inconsistencies in our axioms, we can prove some state-
ments to be true and others to be false. However, since Goe¨del[1] and Tarski[2], we know
there will always be other statements we can not decide.
In principle, that could lead to no problems when we try to describe the real world,
except for a radical program of logicism. Indeed, we assume that our theories can not decide
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all the details of the universe. We usually assume theories also need boundary and initial
conditions. Gravitation theories do not tell us how many planets exist in a solar system;
theories in physics are supposed to have undecidable components that we will observe and
not deduct. Auxiliary hypothesis [3, 4]are unavoidable. They are not considered a problem
in that context. Indeed, we often use them to rescue theories when experiments and theories
do not agree. Take the case of both dark matter and dark energy. We do not know what they
are, nor if they exist. However, they are needed as additional terms we add to the equations
of movement of stars in a galaxy and how fast galaxies move from us as a function of their
distances. Interpretations of those terms exist. One of them might be right. However, we
do not know. The error might be in our theories just as it can also be in our observations.
As we try to learn about the real world, things get more complicated. New levels of im-
possibility appear. At least, our theories can make predictions, even if they leave statements
as undecidable. However, we have to compare those predictions against what we observe,
and predictions are never exact, even for deterministic theories. Experiments have errors.
The constants in any theory are only known up to limited precision. That means that even
our most reliable predictions are probabilistic. In chaotic systems, it is even common to
have situations where our best predictions do not limit the possible states of the system to
a narrower range than what we knew before making the prediction. Some regularities might
arise and, when that is the case, we can check them. Nevertheless, comparing observations
to a distribution that is too wide might not provide as much information as we would have
liked.
Worse still, the predictions of a theory are not a well-defined set. As in the solar system
example, we can only try to apply any gravitational theory, Newtonian, general relativity, or
others, if we have extra information. In that case, we need as the auxiliary hypotheses the
characteristics, position, and momenta of each mass in the system. A proper and complete
prediction must also include the process of data gathering. Possible errors in the experimental
setup must be considered. Anything that might interfere with the results – or their precision
– will affect the final probability distributions. At least, that is the ideal and correct case
we get from probabilistic methods. However, considering all possibilities means including
infinite alternatives, making the problem non-computable.
The amount of difficulties we find when we try to create logically sound ways to estimate
theories is so large that we considering alternatives might be necessary sometimes. However,
without the guidance of logically sound methods, we might be left with our natural reasoning.
It is, therefore, worth discussing what we have learned from the most recent experiments in
our cognitive abilities.
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2 Cognition and Beliefs
We have ideas we like. Furthermore, we too often define ourselves in terms of the ideas we
defend. If we are talking about preferences, those identity-defining ideas are perfectly fine.
They are, indeed, one of the bases of a democratic debate. Nevertheless, we also pick ideas
we prefer about how the world is. However, that is not a problem where we can choose.
Whatever our preferences might be, the universe will still be the way it is. Our opinions,
here, do not matter.
Since we can learn and change our minds, that tendency to pick preferred ideas about
the real world might not have been a problem. If it were just a quirk, with no damaging
consequences, we could ignore it. Unfortunately, that is not the case.
Cognitive experiments have been consistently showing we are not born logicians. Instead,
when using our natural skills, we perform poorly even in simple logical and probabilistic
problems [5]. While those errors are quite common, they are not random and do not mean
we are incompetent. Indeed, our mistakes can be understood and classified according to
their causes. One of those causes is the use of fast heuristics [6]. Heuristics are simple rules
of thumbs that fall much shorter of a logical analysis of the problem. They are, however,
much faster. In everyday life, there are often situations where the speed of decision might
matter far more than accuracy.
A second reason for how we do not behave in experiments as well as we should is related
to the experiments themselves. Experimental setups are usually simplified versions of actual
problems. There is evidence our minds work in ways that are similar to a Bayesian inference
[7]. In the experiments, scientists provide information to their subjects, and they expect
those subjects would treat that information as entirely reliable. However, there is no utterly
reliable information in the real world. If one uses the information as data and introduces
the possibility of errors and deceptions, a Bayesian analysis of several experiments show our
behavior is not as wrong as it might have initially looked [8].
That does not mean, however, all our mistakes are functional adaptations to finding the
best answers in the real world. We are overconfident about our reasoning skills [9]. Not only
that but, when we get more information, we can get more confident even when we do not
become better at our estimates [10]. That seems to serve no purpose if what we care about
is finding correct answers. However, being confident helps us convince others [11]. That is a
crucial point.
It seems our argumentation skills did not evolve to help us arrive at the best answers.
Instead, they are probably efficient adaptations for fitting in our social groups [12, 13]. We
evolved our abilities so that we could convince others and get into positions of power. Failing
that, we conform and accept the views of our groups. Fitting in our social group can be much
more important than finding the best idea, at least when the ideas of our group are not an
actual disaster. Instead, we use our reasoning to defend our identity-defining ideas [14, 15].
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Furthermore, being intelligent seems not to help to protect anyone from that problem. Quite
the opposite. It seems that better numeracy skills might, instead, help each person defend
her preferences better [16]. That can make competent people more polarized than those
without the same skills even when data does not support such polarization.
That suggests that having strong beliefs can be very detrimental to our natural reasoning
skills. At least if we mean to use them to reach correct conclusions [17]. Scientists do
get attached to their ideas. Indeed, debates in science can be as heated as in any other
activity. So, it is no surprise we should fall prey to the same biases when debating scientific
issues. That strongly suggests we should not trust our natural reasoning skills whenever that
is possible. Furthermore, we should limit ourselves to the best logical and mathematical
methods we have. As such, even when we reach problems that require infinite capabilities, a
better understanding of what logic and inductive methods suggest can help us learn where
we might be wrong in our current practices.
3 Induction and Bayesian methods
Evaluating theories can not be done based on deductions alone. A mathematical theory tells
what we should observe if it is right. If our observations agree with the theory, that does not
mean the theory is correct. It just means it is compatible with the observations. That is not
all, however. If the observations and theory disagree, that also does not prove the theory
wrong. Something is wrong, of course, but not necessarily the theory. The error might
be in the experiment, in the auxiliary hypothesis, even in the theoretical demonstrations.
Physicists might like the Popperian notion that we can show theories can to be wrong [18].
While that idea can be an excellent approximation in some cases [19], it is not correct.
Comparing observation and predictions can only be done, given our current knowledge,
using inductive methods. Interestingly, there are known ways to treat the problem of the
plausibility of a statement. We can work from reasonable and straightforward desiderata
and prove, up to a trivial transformation, that, if we want to follow them, we must use
probabilities. That also means we must update our plausibilities using Bayes theorem [20].
Other demonstrations that Bayesian methods are the correct way to update plausibilities
include the weak “Dutch book” argument and also maximum entropy methods [21].
Bayesian methods, however, are not entirely accepted [22]. While logically sound, they
suffer from serious uncomputability problems. Indeed, while it is easy to find books on
Bayesian methods, they never propose using the method to its full extent. Approximations
are always presented as valid methods. They are indeed good ways to obtain educated
guesses. However, when one makes an approximation to a logically correct theory, incon-
sistencies can appear. They do appear. Many criticisms and apparent problems we find in
the literature are a consequence of not using the complete – albeit impossible – method [23].
That, of course, does not mean Bayesian methods are wrong. It only means they might not
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be applicable in practice in every problem. That is the case, and finding ways to obtain
better approximations is an open research question.
One of the evident problems in applying Bayesian methods is to determine our initial
probabilistic opinion on the problem, the prior distribution. As probability laws do not
determine those values, people can see them as open. They do depend on what each person
knows. That can be very different from one individual to another. Therefore, while there are
attempts at calculating objective priors, they are often considered subjective. That might
sound as meaning that each person can choose them freely. However, that is only true before
one learns anything. In principle, a person should pick a prior when she starts learning about
the world. From there, she must update that initial guess with everything she has learned in
her entire life. While not precisely infinite information, such an estimate is not computable
in practical terms. Hence, even competent statisticians end up using guesses. However, it is
crucial to recognize that those methods are not perfect implementations.
Another fundamental uncomputable aspect of Bayesian methods comes from the need to
include every possible theory and their variations, including those nobody has ever thought
[24]. That is needed if one wants to obtain actual probability values. Comparing two com-
plete sets of ideas can still be done if we ask how the odds-ratio between the two sets evolve.
In that case, renormalization constants cancel out, and the result does not depend on ideas
outside the set. While useful, this property does not solve the problem of evaluating theories.
As we will see, it allows us to make comparisons, but those still depend on assumptions that
are not part of the compared theories.
4 Theories in physics
One central cause that makes even comparing two theories using Bayesian methods often
impossible is the fact that theories alone do not make probabilistic predictions. If we keep
a theory unchanged, but we alter our assumptions about details like experimental errors
or initial conditions, predictions change. In principle, the prediction of a theory should
include distributions for every possibility associated with errors, possible initial and boundary
conditions, details on other theories and hypotheses, and everything else that might influence
the outcome. Each possibility should be considered and introduced with the proper weight,
pre-obtained from earlier inferential work.
Of course, we can not know all theories and make predictions from them all. That means
it is not possible to calculate the correct predictions of any theory. We can, as always, work
with the assumptions we already know and hope whatever we disregard is very improbable.
If we are lucky, we might get reliable approximations. However, we have no way to estimate
the consequences of disregarding ideas we do not even know.
When comparing specific sets of assumptions, however, Bayesian methods can provide
remarkably precise answers. With a little care, we can even investigate if changing a few
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hypotheses would cause essential changes. Take, for example, the evidence in favor of general
relativity when compared to Newtonian mechanics. If we look at the historical numbers that
suggested general relativity was a better theory, the difference is colossal [25]. Indeed, take
only the case of the precession of the perihelion of Mercury. Given the average observations,
the predictions of both theories, and the standard deviations associated with those numbers,
if we assume errors follow a Normal distribution, the evidence in favor of general relativity
amounts to an odds-ratio of staggering 10445. If one starts thinking there is only one in a
million chance general relativity is better, that ratio will turn that initial believe into a one
in 10439 chances in favor of general relativity.
That calculation, of course, makes several common assumptions, such as the known
structure of the solar system, with its planets and known orbits, for example. It also assumes
the standard versions of both Newtonian mechanics and general relativity. Any corrections
to those theories are left out. There is, however, one hypothesis we can quickly check for its
effect. Those numbers assume a Normal distribution for the experimental errors. Normal
distributions, however, are very thin-tailed functions. When there are several sources of
observational errors, they tend to provide a first approximation. More than that, they work
much better at central values and start failing first at their thin tails.
If we investigate what happens if we replace the distribution with another with much
fatter tails, the difference is also surprising. Assuming a t-distribution with only 10 degrees
of freedom, the support for general relativity falls from 10445 to 1012. It is still a significant
change in opinion, but the awe-inspiring support from only observing Mercury evaporates.
Knowing which distribution to use, however, would require a complete study of how all values
were calculated. That would mean estimates on the possible source of errors both in the
experiment and in the theory. We would also need to calculate how those errors propagate.
The most likely scenario, likely from nothing more than an educated guess, is that errors
should have a distribution with tails fatter than a Normal, but not necessarily so fat. That
would put the odds evidence in favor of general relativity between those two numbers.
Of course, that is the evidence from one case alone. General relativity has been subject
to a variety of other tests and, so far, has shown to be superior in every one of them. That
means the support in its favor today is incredibly strong (if we assume standard auxiliary
hypothesis). The support in favor of our best physical theories might vary. However, when
predictions are far enough when compared to the experimental errors, we can feel entirely
justified at saying that one theory is better. Induction will tell us there are chances we
might be wrong, but chances like one in 10100 are identical to zero to anyone who is not a
mathematician. The difference is purely technical, with no consequences in the real world.
It is easy to see why physicists tend to adopt realism as their favorite philosophical
posture. The precision in our measurements and how they match some observations have only
improved since Wigner [26] labeled mathematical effectiveness as unreasonable. However,
what those calculations tell us is not that our theories are correct or that mathematics rules
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the universe. Those are possibilities, but they belong to pure metaphysics. Nothing in our
experiments tell that. What we do know is that our theories describe what we have observed
incredibly well. However, even the term incredibly only makes sense when compared to
natural human abilities. No matter how many digits we might get right for some theories,
they will be nothing compared to the infinite number of possible digits. We should also
not forget that we were only able to obtain that strength of evidence by making extra
assumptions. That means excluding other possibilities, as we are incapable of theoretical
omniscience. Calculating all likelihoods and theories is impossible. We do not know how
well whatever we have left out might have performed.
On the other hand, there are other fields of scientific knowledge where getting proba-
bilistic predictions from theories, even making many assumptions, is an almost impossible
problem. While it is quite clear what we should assume as the characteristics of the solar
system, assuming how each part influences each other in a social problem is no simple task.
There are just too many possible variables. Furthermore, there too many theories on how we
behave, as individuals and in society. None of those theories work so well that we can discard
the others. As theories and hypotheses become too many, predicting outcomes is no longer
possible. In that case, it is reasonable that many competing ideas can survive even as we
observe how social systems work in the world. The need for theoretical work is clear since we
can not trust our natural reasoning. However, while mathematical and even computational
models are more reliable than human cognition, the impossibility of making precise predic-
tions means we should remain in doubt about which theories can describe those problems
correctly. That suggests that, just as it was natural for physicists to embrace realism, for
researchers in social sciences, the ”everything goes” from post-modernism might seem just
as appealing. Both positions have no logical justification, but they do describe the daily life
of typical research in those areas well.
If we leave historical analysis behind and move to open problems in physics, things are
no longer as easy as they seemed to be. In quite a few open questions, physics now suffers
from a problem of undecidability. Take quantum mechanics. The theory works incredibly
well. It is one of the best cases of success in physics. However, if we try to understand why
quantum mechanics works the way it does, we have to check its competing interpretations.
Those interpretations, except for the question of the impossibility of local hidden variables,
are not experimentally verifiable. The interpretations provide the same equations, the same
predictions. That means that whatever we observe, data will not change our initial opinions.
At all. The interpretations are underdetermined, exactly undecidable.
The same happens with string theory. Despite attempts to find ways to update probabil-
ities with no data support [27], those proposals are only suggestions for picking priors and
heuristical advice, based on past cases, on which path a scientist should take to tackle a new
problem [19]. However, the existence of more than one theory that provides the same pre-
dictions is not a practical problem. Indeed, when estimating how a system will behave, the
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probabilities of each competing theory with identical predictions will add up, making their
outcome more likely. A similar argument exists using alternative methods from Solomonoff
induction [23].
Understanding our limitations is crucial. Physicists have been shielded from those prob-
lems while their theories provided very distinct and decidable outputs. Nevertheless, there
are too many ways we do not know and might never know. At the moment, it seems obtain-
ing approximate estimates is the best we can do. There will be situations when we will have
to accept that we can not discard several competing theories. Our cognitive shortcomings
suggest we should not get attached to any of them, if possible, in order to keep our brains
in their best “truth”-seeking mode.
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